He points out the impossibility of his following an ideal
like Napoleon's, for, conceding the merest chance that doubt may be
wrong, and judgment to follow this life, he would not dare to
slaughter men as Napoleon had for such slight ends. As for
Shakespeare's ideal, he can't write plays like his if he wanted to,
but he has realized things in his life which Shakespeare only
imagined, and which he presumes Shakespeare would not have scorned
to have realized in his life, judging from his fulfilled ambition to
be a gentleman of property at Stratford. He admits, however, that
enthusiasm in belief, such as Luther's, would be far preferable to
his own way of living, and after this, enthusiasm in unbelief, which
he might have if it were not for that plaguy chance that doubt may
be wrong. Gigadibs interposes that the risk is as great for cool
indifference as for bold doubt. Blougram disputes that point by
declaring that doubts prove faith, and that man's free will
preferring to have faith true to having doubt true tips the balance
in favor of faith, and shows that man's instinct or aspiration is
toward belief; that unquestioning belief, such as that of the Past,
has no moral effect on man, but faith which knows itself through
doubt is a moral spur.
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