But herein resteth the difficultie to know what
this good grace is, & wherein it confitted, for peraduenture it be easier
to conceaue then to expresse, we wil therfore examine it to the bottome &
say: that euery thing which pleaseth the mind or sences, & the mind by the
sences as by means instrumentall, doth it for some amiable point or
qualitie that is in it, which draweth them to a good liking and
contentment with their proper obiects. But that cannot be if they discouer
any illfauorednesse or disproportion to the partes apprehensiue, as for
example, when a sound is either too loude or too low or otherwise confuse,
the eare is ill affected: so is th'eye if the coulour be sad or not
liminous and recreatiue, or the shape of a membred body without his due
measures and simmetry, and the like of euery other sence in his proper
function. These excesses or defectes or confusions and disorders in the
sensible objectes are deformities and vnseemely to the sence. In like sort
the mynde for the things that be his mentall obiectes hath his good graces
and his bad, whereof th'one contents him wonderous well, th'other
displeaseth him continually, no more nor no lesse then ye see the discords
of musicke do to a well tuned eare. The Greekes call this good grace of
euery thing in his kinde, [Greek: illegible], the Latines [_decorum_] we
in our vulgar call it by a scholasticall terme [_decencie_] our owne Saxon
English terme is [_seemelynesse_] that is to say, for his good shape and
vtter appearance well pleasing the eye, we call it also [_comelynesse_]
for the delight it bringeth comming towards vs, and to that purpose may be
called [_pleasant approche_] so as euery way seeking to expresse this
[Greek: illegible] of the Greekes and _decorum_ of the Latines, we are
faine in our vulgar toung to borrow the terme which our eye onely for his
noble prerogatiue ouer all the rest of the sences doth vsurpe, and to
apply the same to all good, comely, pleasant and honest things, euen to
the spirituall obiectes of the mynde, which stand no lesse in the due
proportion of reason and discourse than any other materiall thing doth in
his sensible bewtie, proportion and comelynesse.
Pages:
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320